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Abstract
There has been tremendous interest in the development of formal trust mod-
els and metrics through the use of analytics (e.g., Belief Theory and Bayesian
models), logics (e.g., Epistemic and Subjective Logic) and other mathemati-
cal models. The choice of trust metric will depend on context, circumstance
and user requirements and there is no single best metric for use in all cir-
cumstances. Where different users require different trust metrics to be em-
ployed the trust score calculations should still be based on all available trust
evidence. Trust is normally computed using past experiences but, in practice
(especially in centralised systems), the validity and accuracy of these experi-
ences are taken for granted. In this paper, we provide a formal framework
and practical blockchain-based implementation that allows independent trust
providers to implement different trust metrics in a distributed manner while
still allowing all trust providers to base their calculations on a common set of
trust evidence. Further, our design allows experiences to be provably linked to
interactions without the need for a central authority. This leads to the notion of
evidence-based trust with provable interactions. Leveraging blockchain allows
the trust providers to offer their services in a competitive manner, charging fees
∗Corresponding author
Email address: shantanu.pal@qut.edu.au (Shantanu Pal)






















while users are provided with payments for recording experiences. Performance
details of the blockchain implementation are provided.
Keywords: Trust management, Trust modelling, Evidence-based trust,
Verifiable interaction, Blockchain, Security, Internet of things
1. Introduction
The notion of trust is fundamental to our society. Trust provides many prac-
tical benefits including a sound and inexpensive basis for cooperation between
two or more entities when uncertainty and risks exist [1]. Commonly, a question
can arise as to whether one can trust an entity and if so in what aspect and to
what extent. In general, trust is used to resolve choices into decisions. Trust is
context sensitive, subjective and may vary in different ways based on social and
other issues [2]. Two entities may not draw the same conclusions about whether
to trust a third entity, based on the particular context and the particular needs
that confront them.
Trust in computing systems is normally evaluated based on past experi-
ence [3]. That is, predictions are made about an entity’s future behaviour by
analysing their past behaviour. When an entity is deciding whether to trust an-
other entity, the trusting entity (or trustor, i.e., who is trusting) may not only
make use of their past interactions with the trustee entity (i.e., who is being
trusted), but may also make use of the past history of interactions that other
entities have had with the trustee [4]. This process depends upon information
about those past interactions being available. The more such evidence that is
available and the more reliable such information is, the higher the quality of
future predictions that can be made. This prediction normally takes the form
of a trust score.
Calculations of the trust score may be based on a user’s trust, device’s trust
or a system’s trust. It may depend upon the context and the requirements of
the system [5]. In general, the trust score qualifies or quantifies the relationship
between the trustor and the trustee within a specific context. This can consist of
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direct trust (i.e., the trustee’s experience with an entity) and recommendation
trust (i.e., a third party’s experience with the entity). In particular, recommen-
dation trust is useful in highly dynamic and large-scale systems to enable new
interactions with some control on the risk inherent to uncertainty. However,
there is often no guarantee that the entities providing recommendation trust
information have actually interacted with the trustee. If these interactions can
be efficiently proven to have occurred then the basis on which trust is quantified
becomes much more solid.
The issue of trust becomes even more important given the nature and scale
of present day computing systems [6]. In such systems there will be no central
entity which will be universally trusted to compile the evidence of interactions
and calculate the degree to which entities should be trusted. Unfortunately,
having such a central point is common to a number of trust system proposals.
What is even more common in such proposals in the literature is a single, par-
ticular means of calculating the trust score. A multitude of such proposals has
been made, varying in their approach, aims and intended context of use. On the
one hand, this is understandable. As noted above, different entities will wish
to make trust decisions based on different factors. On the other hand, these
systems often assume all users will use the same trust calculation. We contend
that such a situation needs reconsideration.
In one sense, trust can be viewed as providing information to an entity, be
that entity a human user or system entity. That is, the trust system is provid-
ing a service [7]. There is nothing, at least in concept, preventing trust being
regarded as a service, with different users wanting their information calculated
and presented in different ways, analogous to any other service. This can also
explain why users may wish to avail themselves of a trust service. As with any
other service, users could implement the functionality themselves, but it is more
efficient to rely on a service provider, who, in this case, manages the transforma-
tion of evidence into a trust score. We might, indeed, imagine competing trust
services, each offering to provide trust scores for entities within the system.
These trust services (or trust providers) may use different algorithms for calcu-
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Figure 1: Relationship among feedbacks, interactions and reviews.
lating trust, even charging for the service (and charging at varying rates). One
issue, though, is that all the trust providers would need access to all the trust
evidence. If each service attempted to collect its own set of evidence, the overall
evidence base would be fragmented, leading to a lowering of the reliability of
the trust scores.
We can observe that there are three significant prerequisites for computing
trust, (i) trust is relevant when there is a choice1, (ii) trust can be built up
from existing evidence, and (iii) the more reliable evidence available, the more
reliable the trust score.
In this paper, we develop a framework that enables a set of trust providers
to independently provide trust scores, all using the same set of evidence. The
evidence can be traced back to interactions that can be proven to have occurred.
The formalisation of the trust calculation is achieved through a framework that
can be tailored for specific needs. We use a global set of evidences as a universal
basis for the trust calculation. An evidence is composed of an interaction and
an experience in the form of a review. If the interaction is proven to have oc-
1The choice here can be binary i.e., should an entity interact with another one or not, or
comparative multi-lateral i.e., which subset of entities from a larger set can be trusted.
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curred and the review is proven to pertain to that interaction, then it becomes
a feedback. Once the set of interactions and feedbacks is set, trust scores can
be calculated. As an example, a basic trust scoring mechanism µ is defined on
sequences of feedbacks called feedback traces. In Figure 1, we show the rela-
tionship among feedbacks, interactions and evidences. One well known example
of a scoring mechanism is averaging, which takes a qualitative or quantitative
average of atomic feedback ratings. A scoring mechanism can also exhibit more
complex features e.g., temporal flow. The final trust score is then defined as a
weighted combination of basic scores through a feedback selection ω. Intuitively,
each interaction may have multiple feedbacks and the feedback selection ω for-
mally handles how much they should contribute to a particular feedback trace.
We show through various examples that the combination of a scoring mechanism
µ and feedback selection ω is general enough to capture many known practi-
cal cases, while providing a simple but essential formalisation. This simplicity
allows us to prove important results e.g., the soundness of our framework for
streams of interactions and feedbacks. In particular, we prove a convergence
theorem for a broad class of scoring mechanism µ when infinite streams of feed-
backs are considered.
Our formalised framework requires two fundamental properties relating to
the availability of a universal set of evidences and the existence of an evi-
dence mapping that links feedbacks to interactions. In practice, we show that
a platform using blockchain can be used to implement these two properties. A
blockchain is a distributed digital ledger of transactions accessible across the
network [8]. In addition to being distributed, the ledger also possesses other
important properties e.g., verifiable (transactions can be linked back to the in-
volved parties, or at least their public addresses), immutable (transactions are
extremely hard to amend once recorded in a block) and programmable (smart
contracts can be used to automatically execute computable functions on the
ledger) [9]. They become automatically transparent and universal and, with
the help of smart contracts, we can ensure the construction of an evidence map-
ping. Moreover, this map can be verified, by all parties interacting through
5
the blockchain, to be sound. That is, for each feedback, an interaction indeed
occurred and the feedback is provably linked to that interaction (e.g., it was
submitted by the same user that had the interaction). By storing the feed-
back information in the blockchain it can be accessed by any trust provider,
allowing all trust providers to base their calculation of trust scores on the same
evidence set, while carrying out the calculations using different trust calculation
algorithms. We can further leverage the ability of blockchains to implement fi-
nancial operations to enable to provision of trust as a payable service, and even
reward users for providing evidence.
We believe that the use of blockchain [10] in this manner constitutes another
step towards a robust distributed trust system that would overcome many of the
challenges associated with centralisation, either in the form of a single entity
calculating trust scores, or reliance on a single method for calculating such
scores. To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present the foundation for evidence-based trust with verifiable in-
teractions that can be used by any trust providers associated with the
blockchain.
• We develop a theoretical framework that is generic enough to be used with
off-the-shelf trust scoring mechanisms and demonstrate how difference
mechanisms can access the same evidence information on the blockchain.
• We use blockchain as a platform that implements our formalised frame-
work. The required preconditions are ensured by the blockchain proper-
ties.
• We provide a detailed proof-of-concept implementation of our proposed
platform using an Ethereum network and investigate its performance.
• We discuss about known attacks on trust systems and show how our propo-
sition can improve their mitigations.
The listed contributions highlight that we are developing a trust management
infrastructure rather than creating a new trust metric. We develop the notion of
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trust providers which are responsible for implementing concrete and specialised
trust quantification routines depending on the underlying application and the
infrastructure for provision of a trust service, which allows users to select their
preferred trust provider.
Paper organisation and roadmap: The rest of the paper is organised as
follows. In Section 2, we present motivation of our study. In Section 3, we
provide preliminaries related to trust, its quantification and trust dynamics. In
Section 4, we present our framework for trust scoring with verifiable interaction.
We illustrate platform design and architecture in Section 5, followed by system
evaluation in Section 6. In Section 7, we provide a discussion on attacks on trust
systems and the benefits of our proposed solution. In Section 8, we present an
extensive related work to show the novelty of our proposal over the existing
proposals. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. Motivation
In this section, we present a motivating use-scenario to show how our pro-
posed model would work in a real-life setting. For our example use-case, we
consider an Internet-based business model that is composed of many stakehold-
ers, in our case, resource providers, and consumers (cf. Figure 2). A resource
provider is an entity that owns a resource and wants to sell access to it. A
consumer is an entity that wants to access the resource and is willing to pay
for such access. When a consumer wishes to purchase an access, they need to
contact a specific resource provider that manages and advertises the underlying
service. That is, we are considering a digital marketplace. Further, we wish to
consider situations where the resource providers and consumers are not mem-
bers of a single organisation or management domain. Consumers, especially,
may have varying needs and considerations that effect their preferred method
of trust score calculation. That is, we are considering ‘open’ situations where
there would be no single entity trusted by all parties to collect and manage













Figure 2: A simple outline of a use-case where a consumer wants to buy a resource from a
resource provider.
More concretely, let us assume consumers who wish to print documents. A
range of resource providers provide printing services. The first question the
consumer confronts is which resource provider to use. The services provided by
different resource providers may differ. For instance, one may offer cheaper ser-
vice at a lower quality (e.g., pickup from the printers themselves) while another
may charge higher fees for extra convenience. In such a situation, the consumer
may proceed with a choice that they themselves can resolve by investigating
the service offerings and/or considering the prices offered. However, there may
be service providers who offer the same or similar services that meet the con-
sumers requirements (e.g., paper stock, print quality, etc.). In such cases the
consumer is faced with a more difficult choice. The consumer can turn to a
trust provider to determine which service provider should be chosen (i.e., which
is most trusted).
While a consumer will be certain of the validity of their own previous inter-
actions with the service providers, they cannot rely on their own knowledge to
provide certainty in the interactions that other consumers have had. Further, if
they are to employ a trust provider, there is the question of what metric should
be employed to calculate the trust score.
Previous consumers that have used the services can leave their reviews to
be viewed by others. A review becomes a feedback once it is verified by the
system that an interaction has indeed occurred. This is a significant property of
our system because such verification is usually not handled by traditional trust
systems — they may simply accept the reviewer’s word that an interaction has
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occurred. The feedbacks from the previous consumers are then ingested by a
Trust Provider and used to produce a trust score for the underlying service.
The consumer can use this score to resolve their choice and decide which broker
to use while taking into account all the previous interactions of their peers with
the service provider.
Essentially there are two questions. Firstly, how can there be certainty in
the evidence being used in calculation of the trust score and, secondly, how
should the trust score be calculated. The two questions are linked, in that the
calculation of the trust score depends, in part, on the evidence. Beyond that,
the second question addresses the issue of what metric to employ. It cannot
be said that there is a universal best trust metric, or even that in any given
situation one metric is definitively superior. This is shown by the vast range
of metrics proposed in the literature. Therefore different trust providers could
employ different metrics, and different consumers could select between different
trust providers on that basis. For example, trust metrics may differ in the
weight they place on recent interactions versus interactions in the more distant,
or in the means they use to combat attacks e.g., white/black washing, feedback
collusion and sybil attacks. However, all trust providers need access to all the
evidence to produce the most reliable trust scores.
This leads to our proposed solution, where evidence is stored on the blockchain
in the form of verified feedback. Such feedback can be accessed by any trust
provider, which offer the provision of trust scores as a service. As an added
benefit, the integration of blockchain into our system enables the payment for
resource access, including trust score provision. Trust providers can implement
different trust metrics, in a method analogous to different web search services
implementing different search algorithms.
The notion of trust provider is one of the central components of the trust sys-
tem. A trust provider uses information stored in the blockchain to derive trust
scores for the resource services. This information is built from atomic blocks
called evidence. An evidence is mainly composed of two segments, (i) a Proof
of Interaction (PoI) and (ii) a feedback. The PoI is an automatically generated
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token that can be linked back to a proof of access right, another token that is
generated once the consumer is given access to the printer (cf. [11] of Section V).
Therefore, a PoI can be linked to the actual purchase of service and the access
to the corresponding resource. The feedback is a rating that a consumer leaves
based on their experience with the resource provider. Both of these data seg-
ments are stored on the blockchain which leads to many advantages discussed
as follows.
• The evidences from which trust scores are computed are available to all
parties. This means that the set of evidence and trust scoring mechanisms
has the following properties:
– Universal : Multiple trust providers use the exact same set of evi-
dences, even though they may use different trust scoring mechanisms
producing different trust score values.
– Transparent : Even though any scoring mechanism used by the trust
providers may be proprietary, the underlying data used for computing
the trust score is open (e.g., PageRank by Google).
– Verifiable/Auditable: An evidence can be verified by any party in-
cluding the resource providers, the consumers and the trust providers.
The auditability here extends to metadata. For instance, a trust
provider would know for certain over what time period, with what
sort of distribution the accesses and feedbacks are recorded in the
blockchain.
• The evidence is immutable i.e., no one can tamper with it. This applies
to all the information constituting the evidence (i.e., the PoI and the feed-
back) and it also extends other properties e.g., logical timestamp (block
number) and other metadata. Moreover, we can securely ensure that the
feedback is submitted by the owner of a PoI. This is crucial for verifiable
interaction.
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• Offline trust scoring is possible. The trust calculation can be achieved
offline and final scores can be stored in the blockchain. This means that
the trust as a service point-of-view does not require any separate always-on
component.
• Review submissions can be readily incentivised using the underlying crypto-
currency. Likewise, submission abuse can be penalised using the same
economics.
Consumers could, in fact, use the evidence on the blockchain to carryout
the trust score calculation themselves. In the same way that most users of the
Internet do not implement their own search engine, we anticipate that most
users would prefer to leave trust score computation to specialist trust providers.
3. Preliminaries: quantitative models of trust
In this paper, we are mostly concerned with reasoning about trust supported
by recorded experience or evidence. Thus we restrict ourselves to notions of
trust that can be quantified e.g., reliability, performance or quality of service.
We start by briefly reviewing established quantification method using direct
observation or third-party referral. We will also review trust models that are
directly related to the framework we develop in Section 4.
3.1. Quantifying trust
We take a quantitative approach to reason about trust, based on evidences
which are built from PoI and feedback. The feedback records quantitative or
qualitative measures of different aspects of the interactions that have occurred.
For instance, they can represent satisfaction2, value-to-cost ratio and so on.
The feedbacks are usually personal experiences that entities experience through
interacting between each other. In this case, the trust calculation is based on
2Satisfaction can be directly measured through a recorded discrete value or inferred from
textual feedback through sentiment analysis.
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direct experiences by “aggregating” individual feedback scores to form an overall
personal opinion about the quality of service or reliability of a trustee. However,
direct experience is not always possible since no interaction may have occurred
yet between the trustor and trustee. In this case, the trustor would leverage on
third-party evidences to infer a recommendation score. [12, 13].
In a recommendation, the trustor uses a referral score from one or multiple
third-part that have had interacted with the trustee. For instance, user Alice
wants to access a service from a service provider Bob without any prior inter-
action. In this situation, Alice can take a recommendation from her friend Carl
who has had some interaction with Bob. This is a transitive trust calculation
process where the final trust value between Alice and Bob is a combination of
Alice’s trust with Carl and Carl’s trust with Bob.
Since our trust calculations are based upon a universal set of evidences, the
calculation of trust through direct observation and indirect recommendation is
carried out through a single formal framework. This unification is important to
support our notion of Trust as a Service through the use of Trust Providers.
3.2. Trust models
There are different models for quantitative trust, e.g., Belief Theory [14]
[15], Subjective Logic [16], Bayesian models [17, 18], etc. The most relevant
techniques to our approach include Dampster’s Belief Theory [15] and Jonker
and Treur’s [19] formal approach to the dynamics of experience based trust.
3.2.1. Belief theory
This is also known as Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) or evidence theory in-
troduced by Dempster around 1960 [20]. It is a general probabilistic framework
for reasoning about priori (incomplete) knowledge i.e., with epistemic uncer-
tainty. Intuitively, it uses belief functions to reason about probability, possi-
bility and plausibility. Later in the 1970s, Dempster enhanced his theory to
incorporate the notion of evidence from different sources. These evidences are
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collected to form a mathematical framework for reasoning about beliefs in the
system.
A central component of DST is the notion of belief and plausibility measures
which are interlinked through the following equation:
Pl(p) = 1− Bel(¬p) . (1)
Intuitively, Bel measures the strength of the evidence at supporting a claim
expressed as a proposition p. Plausibility is then derived from Bel through
Equation 1. The interval [Bel(p),Pl(p)] quantifies the epistemic uncertainty
regarding proposition p. Our development in this paper is simpler as we assume
that an evidence is restricted to a provable interaction and experience without
epistemic uncertainty. In fact, the set of evidence can be verified as accurate
but we leave the inherent uncertainty in “quantifying an experience” for future
work. Thus, the scoring mechanisms we establish in Section 4.2 can be noted
as simple manifestations of plausibility functions.
3.2.2. Trust dynamics through experience
In [19], Jonker and Treur analyse the dynamics of trust through a simple yet
elegant formalism based on the notion of trust evolution. The core idea was to
update trust based on the past evidences, i.e., a trust evolution function maps a
sequence of experiences to a trust value. This update is constrained by specific
properties e.g., monotonicity and positiveness/negativeness which dictate the
direction of changes the evolution function should take given some recent evi-
dence. Many other properties are also listed in [19]. The proposed framework in
this paper can be seen as a generalisation of [19] with a specific focus on quanti-
tative evaluation. We also make use of newly developed blockchain technologies
to add the novel notion of verifiable interaction to this type of formalisation.
4. Framework for trust scoring with verifiable interaction
This section introduces the foundation of our trust calculation in the pres-
ence of verifiable interactions. In traditional review systems, trust scores or
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reputation values are mostly computed from review details e.g., score and tem-
poral metadata. In our setting, the existence of verifiable interaction takes a
central role and the notion of scoring is developed around the notion of feed-
back, interaction and service. In other word, feedbacks and interactions form
the evidences for/or against the quality of a service.
4.1. The fundamental maps: Evidence map and service projection
The formalisation of our trust system is based on the evidence map ε:X→I
and the service projection π:I→Y . The map ε is a partial function from the set
of reviews X to the set of interactions I. Since ε is partial, not all reviews are
mapped to interactions. In contrast, any review in the domain of ε is called a
feedback, i.e., a feedback has a proven interaction.
The projection map π simply projects each interaction to the associated
service in Y . The functional composition ε◦π:X→Y gives the set of reviews
with provable interactions associated to a service. That is, for every y ∈ Y , the
set of feedbacks for y is given by (ε◦π)−1(y) ⊆ X 3.
An example of evidence mapping and service project is illustrated in Figure 3
and explained in Example 1. In the sequel, the primitive sets X, I and Y
are assumed to be countable, i.e., they are either finite sets or have the same
cardinality as the set of natural numbers N.
In our trust system, the existence of the maps ε and π is ensured by the
following two fundamental properties:
Property 1. Evidence are accessible to all parties interacting with the system.
This means that the sets X, I and Y are accessible from a shared medium – the
blockchain.
Property 2. A feedback is always supported by an interaction.
3Since the inverse function of an arbitrary map is a set function, the rigorous notation is
here (ε◦π)−1({y}). However, we drop the set brackets around y to make the notation lighter.



















review but not a feedback
Figure 3: Evidence map and service projection.
In Section 6.1, we show in detail how our implementation ensures these
properties using the characteristics of a blockchain.
Example 1. In the system state given in Figure 3, we have a set of reviews
X = {x11, x12, x2, x3, x4}, a set of interactions I = {i1, i2, i3} and a set of
services Y = {y1, y3}.
• The evidence map is defined by ε(x11) = ε(x12) = i1, ε(x2) = i2 and
ε(x3) = i3.
• The projection map is defined by π(i1) = π(i2) = y1 and π(i3) = y3.
• The set of feedbacks is (ε◦π)−1(Y ) = {x11, x12, x2, x3}.
• x4 is a review but it is not a feedback.
When the evidence map ε is not injective, then we are required to “select” a
feedback associated to the interaction to form an evidence. More generally, we
define this selection using probabilistic weights as follows:
Definition 1. An evidence selection is a map ω : I×X→[0, 1] such that, for all
i ∈ I, we have ∑
x∈ε−1(i)
ω(i, x) = 1 (2)
Intuitively, for any fixed interaction i, an evidence selection ω chooses a
feedback x probabilisticaly according to the weight ω(i, x) in Equation (2). If ε
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is injective, then there is only a single evidence selection map where ω(i, x) = 1
iff ε(x) = i.
Example 2. Here are few common examples of evidence selections:
• Deterministic selection: for every interaction i ∈ I, there exists some
feedback x ∈ ε−1(i) such that ω(i, x) = 1. This means that ω(i, x′) = 0 for
any other review x′ 6= x.
• Uniform selection: for every i ∈ I and x ∈ X, ω(i, x) = 1|ε−1(i)| where
|ε−1(i)| is the number of feedback in ε−1(i). This selection only applies to
finite sets of feedbacks.
• Fresh-biased selection: for every i ∈ I and xk ∈ X with rank k ≥ 0 out
of N feedbacks, ω(i, xk) =
(1−q)qN−k+1
1−qN+1 where the ratio q ∈ [−1, 1] is fixed.
This selection will assign higher weights to more recent feedbacks if the
rank captures the temporal order in which feedbacks are submitted. The
rank can be generalised to other forms of total ordering.
• Geometric (decayed) selection: for every i ∈ I and xk ∈ X with rank
k ≥ 0, ω(i, xk) = (1 − q)qk. This selection will assign higher weights to
older feedbacks. This needs a q ∈ [−1, 1] and infinitely many feedbacks to
converge but a finite version can also be constructed.
In addition to properties 1 and 2 listed above, here are few optional proper-
ties that translate directly to functional characteristics of the evidence mapping:
• An interaction can have at most one feedback : this means that the function
ε is injective. This property can be implemented or simulated in many
different ways depending on the underlying system. The easiest way to
simulate this property is to use a deterministic evidence selection ω which
is the approach we take in this paper.
• Any review is a feedback : this means that ε is a total function. This is
usually hard to enforce especially on an open and distributed system like
ours.
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• A feedback is mandatory after each interaction: this means that ε is a
surjective function. Similar to the previous totality property, this is also
hard to enforce in practice.
4.2. Trust score evaluation
In general, scoring functions or trust calculations are performed over se-
quences of feedbacks by Trust providers. In this paper, we do not assume any
specific trust calculation but rather provide a general framework that supports
various implementations of such calculations. We define the notion of sequence
of feedbacks using the interaction set I as set of indices.
Definition 2. A feedback trace is a function α:I→X such that ε◦α = id where
id is the identity function of I 4. A feedback trace is finite if it has a finite
domain or, equivalently, range.
Note this implies that a feedback trace α is always injective.
Example 3. Here are some feedback traces associated to the system state illus-
trated in Figure 3.
{}, {i1 7→x11}, {i1 7→x12}, {i2 7→x2}, {i3 7→x3}, {i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2}, {i1 7→x12, i2 7→x3},
{i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3}, {i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3}, {i1 7→x12, i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3}, . . .
The sequence of feedback traces in Example 3 is printed in “increasing or-
der”. Formally, for every feedback traces α and β, we have
α ≤ β iff there exists A ⊆ I such that α = β|A (3)
This order is the well-known ordering of partial functions and it turns the set
of feedback traces into a partially ordered set 5. A feedback trace α is maximal
if for every feedback trace β, α ≤ β implies α = β.
4Note that α is not necessarily total so a more precise definition is that ε◦α is a restriction
of the identity function id. However, we simply use id to simplify the presentation.
5In fact, this order is directed-complete.
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Example 4. We have the following orderings between the feedback traces of
Example 3:
- {} ≤ α for every feedback trace α,
- {i1 7→x11} ≤ {i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2} ≤ {i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3}
- {i1 7→x11} and {i1 7→x12} are incomparable and so is any pair of feedback
traces containing them, respectively.
- {i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3} and {i1 7→x12, i2 7→x2, i3 7→x3} are maximal feed-
back traces.
Lemma 1. The set of feedback traces is prefix closed. That is, if β is a feedback
trace and α ≤ β then α is also a feedback trace.
Proof. Any restriction α|A of a feedback trace α will also satisfy ε◦(α|A) =
(ε◦α)|A = id. The first equation follows from the fact that ε◦(α|A) and (ε◦α)|A
have the same domain (intersection of the domain of α and A) on which they
coincide.
The partial order in Equation (3) and Lemma 1 help ensure that every
feedback trace can be obtained as the supremum of an increasing sequence of
feedback traces. This is particularly important when we are inductively building
traces. Moreover, if ε has a finite domain, then there are always maximal
feedback traces with respect to the partial order ≤.
Similar to sets, feedback traces also have a notion of size defined by |α| =
|α(I)| = |α−1(X)|. It is clear to see that if α ≤ β then |α| ≤ |β|.
Definition 3. A scoring mechanism is a function µ:(I→X)→R+ such that
µ(α) ≤ |α| for every non-empty feedback trace α.
Intuitively, a scoring mechanism maps a feedback trace into a non-negative
score. It does not need to be total but it must be defined over all possible
feedback traces, which form a subset of I→X.
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The condition µ(α) ≤ |α| ensures that a score can only grow as fast as
the feedback trace, which is a natural assumption. More precisely, this condi-
tion ensures that µ is uniformly bounded even though there can be infinitely
many reviews associated to finitely many interactions. A slightly more general
assumption can be written as µ(α) ≤ C|α| where C is a fixed constant indepen-
dent of α. For instance, C can be the absolute maximum rating a feedback can
have. The value of the constant C can vary from a scoring mechanism to an-
other but it is not important for our theoretical development. Thus, we assume
C = 1 for all scoring mechanism.
A scoring mechanism takes a special value on the empty feedback trace
{}. For instance, if µ is restricted to have values in [0, 1] then a convention
µ({}) = 0.5 means that, in the absence of any evidence, we assign a fair score of
0.5. Such a convention is entirely left to the implementation and can vary from
one trust provider to another.
We now give the definition of trust score in the context of verifiable interac-
tions.
Definition 4. Let A be a finite set of interactions. The A-recommendation










Intuitively, the sum in Equation (4) is over the maximal elements of the set
of feedback traces with domain included in A. The generic scoring µ evaluates
these maximal feedback traces. Each of the maximal feedback trace is associated
with a weight accumulated over the interactions through the feedback selection
ω. For a given feedback trace α, this weight is
∏
α(i)=x ω(i, x). Thus, the final
score σ(A) is the weighted average of the scores of each feedback trace with
domain A.
Definition 4 is very general and facilitates the proofs for our technical foun-
dation. A finite context A is important for the sum on the right hand side of
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Equation (4) to be well-defined. The sum can still be over infinitely many feed-
back traces but we prove in Theorem 2 that the right hand side of Equation (4)
always converges if A is a finite set. If A is infinite countable then there is a
sequence of finite sets (An)n such that An ⊆ An+1 and
⋃





when the right hand side exists. In contrast, σ(∅) = µ({}), a score chosen by
the underlying trust provider.
In practice, we need to compute the recommended trust score of a service.
Definition 4 then specialises as follows.
Definition 5. Let y ∈ Y be a service and U be a finite set of interactions. The
U -recommendation score for service y with respect to µ and ω is
σ(y|U) = σ(π−1(y) ∩ U) (6)
In practice, the context U ⊆ I in Definition 5 is obtained by looking at the
interactions belonging to a set of users. For instance, a recommendation trust
score from a given user is obtained by setting U to be the set of interactions
that user has had dealing with service y. If the trust scoring is user agnostic,
that is U = I, then we simply write
σ(y|I) = σ(y) = σ(π−1(y)) (7)
Moreover, if ε is injective, then the inverse function ε−1 exists and is the only
maximal feedback trace. That is, any feedback α satisfies α ≤ ε−1 making ε−1
the maximum element of the set of possible feedback traces. In this case, the
only feedback trace involved in the sum for σ(A) in Equation (4) is ε−1|A. Thus
Equation (7) gives





where the second equation follow from the fact that ε is injective and we only
have deterministic feedback selection. Here, ε−1|π−1(y) is the restriction of ε−1
to the set of interactions π−1(y).
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The function σ, or alternatively the pair (µ, ω), is a scoring function that
is implemented by each trust provider. Each scoring function can have its own
characteristics that mitigates partially or fully against certain type of attacks
(see Section 7).
In general, a naive implementation of the recommendation score function σ
can be exponential in the number of interactions. More precisely, if there are
m interactions with n feedbacks each, then a direct implementation of Equa-
tion (4) would have a time complexity of O(nm). Note however that optimised
implementations can be achieved. For instance, the average scoring below can
have an online complexity of O(1) if the evidence selection is deterministic and
only the current average score and the number of past interactions are stored.
The characterisation of the efficient scoring mechanisms is out of the scope of
this paper.
4.3. Average score
One of the most common form of scoring mechanism is averaging. Let us
assume the existence of a binary satisfaction rating function ρ:X→{0, 1} which
projects a review to its recorded rating — either good (1) or bad (0). The






Averaging is quite robust in the sense that, when there is a large amount of
feedback, the score is stable and a large amount of effort is required to generate
a considerable score change. However, it also has its drawbacks. For instance, it
ignores the temporal information associated with the order in which feedbacks
were submitted.
We can define a scoring mechanism which takes advantage of the temporal
sequence of interactions as in Example 2. In fact, µ can be extremely complex
6Sums like this, i.e., without explicit restriction on i in the sum, is understood to range
over the domain the summed function. In this case, the sum is over the domain of α.
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as the interactions and feedbacks have, at least, the following metadata: user
identification, service identification, access identification, real or logical time
and service rating. In practice, there should be a balance between robustness,
complexity and efficiency.
Example 5. Let us consider the system state depicted in Figure 3 and a trust
provider using the average scoring mechanism and uniform evidence selection.
Assume the ratings associated to each respective feedbacks are ρ(x11) = 0 and
ρ(x12) = 1 = ρ(x2). We have the following evaluation and properties.
• For service y2, σ(y2, {i1}) = 0 but σ(y2, {i2}) = σ(y2) = 1.
• For service y1, the are two possible maximal feedback traces: α1 = (i1 7→x11, i2 7→x2)
and α2 = (i1 7→x12, i2 7→x2). We have µ(α1) = ρ(x11)+ρ(x2)2 = 0.5 and
µ(α2) =
ρ(x12)+ρ(x2)
2 = 1. Since ω is uniform, the overall score of service
y is
σ(y1) = µ(α1)×0.5 + µ(α2)×0.5 = 0.75
However, if i1 and i2 are interactions of two different users with the service
y1, then the recommendation score from the first user is
σ(y1, {i1}) = µ(α1|{i1})×0.5 + µ(α2|{i1})×0.5 = 0×0.5 + 1×0.5 = 0.5
Similarly, the recommendation score from the second user is
σ(y1, {i2}) = 1
• If another trust provider uses the fresh-biased evidence selection then
σ′(y1) ' µ(α1)×0.33 + µ(α2)×0.67 = 0.835
and
σ′(y1, {i1}) ' µ(α1|{i1})×0.33 + µ(α2|{i1})×0.67 = 0.67 .
In other words, this trust provider is more likely to recommend the service
y1 than the previous trust provider.
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• In this particular example, the values taken by the scoring mechanism µ is
in [0, 1]. By Lemma (1) below, the recommendation score is also in [0, 1].
• µ is ρ-monotonic, that is, if ρ(x) ≤ ρ(x′) then µ(α[i7→x]) ≤ µ(α[i7→x′])
for every feedback trace α. Here α[i7→x] substitutes α(i) with x or extends
α with {i7→x} if i is not in the domain of α.
4.4. Soundness of trust scoring
The following lemma is a natural consequence of the fact that we choose feed-
back probabilistically for a given interaction. It implies two important theorems
which we elaborate in the sequel.





ω(i, x) = 1 (10)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the set A.
• If A = ∅ then the sum in Equation (10) is only coming from the empty
feedback trace. By convention, the product over an empty set is 1 so that the
sum in Equation (10) is also 1.






























α(i)=x ω(i, x) “Equation (2)”
= 1 “Induction Hypothesis”
Hence, Equation (10) always holds.
The following theorem shows that we can safely restrict to using scores
between [0, 1] as in most traditional trust formalisation.
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Theorem 1. If µ(α) ≤ 1 for every feedback trace α, then σ(A) ≤ 1 for every
set of interaction A (when it is defined).
Proof. Let A ⊆ I be a finite set of interactions. The equation σ(A) ≤ 1 simply














α(i)=x ω(i, x) “µ(α) ≤ 1”
= 1 “Lemma 2”
The infinite case follows from the fact that the limit of a convergent sequence of
real numbers in [0, 1] is in that interval (compactness of the unit interval).
Note that, even if µ(α) ≤ 1 for every feedback trace α but A is infinite, then
σ(A) does not necessarily exist. For instance, let us take a system where there
is exactly one feedback for each review and the feedback ratings are alternating
back and forth from 0 to 1, for each successive interaction. If µ simply returns
the latest rating in a feedback trace then it will also take alternating values. In
this case, we obtain a sequence of set of interactions such that σ(An) = 0 (resp.
1) and σ(An+1) = 1 (resp. 0). This sequence does not have a limit.
The following theorem is one of our main theoretical result ensuring the
soundness of the recommendation score calculation even at the limits.
Theorem 2. Any recommendation trust scoring σ is well-defined and σ(A) ≤
|A| for every finite set A ⊆ I. That is, the right hand side of Equation (4)
always converges as long as the context A is finite.
Proof. Firstly, it follows from Lemma 2 that σ(A) ≤ |A|. This means that the
right hand side of Equation (4) is a bounded series of real numbers with non-
negative terms. The general construction of this series is shown in Figure 4. We
















































In this diagram, each interaction ik has an infinite stream of feedback
and each feedback trace is constructed by selecting a review from
each interaction using the weight function ω. This picture shows
the combination of selecting m feedback for each interaction. That
is, the infinite matrix xkl is built by enumerating elements of a set
similar to Nm. We then obtain a sequence of feedback traces (αl)l.
Figure 4: Computation of recommendation for an infinite stream of feedback.
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If A is infinite, then σ(A) is not necessarily finite. A simple counterexample
is to take the sum of individual review ratings for a scoring mechanism. We
can assume that there is only one feedback per interaction and each feedback
has a rating of 1. In this case, we can build an increasing sequence of set of
interactions (An)n such that σ(An) = n.
5. System architecture and implementation
This section shows how we design and implement the formalism of Section 4
on a blockchain platform. We use various basic properties of a blockchain (e.g.,
immutability, transparency, decentralised control, etc.) to ensure that Prop-
erty 1 and 2 are satisfied. This guarantees that the theoretical framework we
have developed in Section 4.2 is sound and practical.
5.1. System architecture
The architecture is illustrated in Figure 5. The core components of the ar-
chitecture are users, user device, trust provides and smart contracts. In our
case, users can be both resource providers and consumers. User devices can
be seen as the smart mobile device carried by the users. These devices can be
used to store information, access a resource, deploy smart contracts, as well
as communicating with one another. Trust provides maintain the trust scores.
Finally, smart contacts are collection of code and data that are used for exe-
cuting agreements between two parties, and stored on a blockchain. We use
three smart contracts, (1) the resource smart contract that handles access to a
resource, (2) the feedback smart contract that handles the reviews submitted by
the end-users, and (3) the trust provider’s smart contract that helps the trust
provides to maintain trust scores. We make use of these various smart contracts
to ensure secure access to any restricted resource.
Note, this architecture is based on our previous works [11, 21] to handle
feedback ratings on the blockchain itself. The architecture presented in [11, 21]





























Trust Provider_1 Trust Provider_2
Figure 5: Architecture of the proposed blockchain platform implementation.
In this paper, in particular, we remove the attribute-based access control in
favour of a generalised access scheme where consumers are able to decide what
resource to use based on any metric that is available, be it price, ease of access
or location. The system is composed of a public blockchain that keeps track of
all delegated access rights, consumer interactions and consumer feedback that
is directly linked to one consumer interaction. The correctness and security of
such a system is explained in more details in [11].
Note, in this paper, we extend our previous architecture (of [11, 21]) by
adding the following two more crucial components (namely, feedback smart
contract and trust providers) to handle reviews and trust score calculations.
These new components are only interacting with the public blockchain. A brief
description for each of them is given as follows:
5.1.1. Feedback smart contract
This smart contract handles reviews submitted by end-users in the system.
In essence, it receives a review rating and ensures that the review is linked to an
interaction. To achieve this, the feedback smart contract performs the following
actions.
• It ensures that a submitted review has the following parts:
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- Address of the user account that submits the review,
- Details of the interaction reviewed, and
- A review rating.
• It checks the existence of the interaction by locating the relevant event in
the blockchain.
• It checks that the user account that submits the review is the same account
that interacted with the service.
• It sanitises the rating and if all of the above checks pass, then an event is
emitted which contains the review details. In this case, the review becomes
a feedback.
An event emitted by the Feedback smart contract is what we would call an
feedback. Since they are provably linked to an interaction, the pair of interaction
and feedback events constitutes an evidence. This evidence is the backbone of
the trust scoring by the trust providers.
The proposed architecture and the implementation of the feedback smart
contract guarantee Property 1 and 2. In particular, there is indeed a well-
defined evidence map ε which is built iteratively as the set of evidence grows.
Moreover, the correctness of the system can be verified by all parties interacting
with the public blockchain.
5.1.2. Trust providers
These entities are responsible for implementing the trust scoring functions
and making the output available to the end-users, possibly in exchange for some
access fee.
Since the soundness of the theoretical framework is ensured mainly by the
feedback smart contract, a trust provider complements that by choosing a scor-
ing mechanism µ and an evidence selection ω to implement. Since we allow
the existence of multiple trust providers, the choice of these functions can vary
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Figure 6: Communication between the various components of the system. Note, for simplicity,
a smart contract is written as contract.
conditions in Definition 1 and 3 are satisfied and that all trust providers are
using the exact same set of evidences stored on the blockchain.
Similarly, to the choice of µ and ω, we leave it to the trust providers to use
an adequate implementation. In our prototype, we have implemented a cached
trust scoring (i.e., scores are cached on the blockchain itself and are re-computed
periodically) with µ computing an average rating over the past interactions and
ω is a deterministic evidence selection.
5.2. Communication
An overview of the communication between the various components of the
system is depicted in Figure 6. We encapsulate the access protocol with the
choice resolution using trust scores and the feedback rating submission after an
interaction. This communication diagram is a simplified illustration of shown
interactions among various components in Figure 5.
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The extended communication between the various principals, seen from the
perspective of a user who wants to use a resource, progresses as follows:
Step 1: When a user wants to use a resource, they need to choose a broker
- whether to use the service provided by an individual (or a group of users).
This choice is resolved by querying for the respective trust scores from one
or many trust providers. This can be another smart contract or even an
off-chain service, if required.
Step 2: The trust provider retrieves a pre-computed score or perform
an on-demand trust score calculation. If the request is through a smart
contract, the output of this interaction is pushed as an encrypted event
using the user’s Ethereum account’s public key. This ensures that, if the
trust provider charges a fee for its service, then only the requesting user
will be able to read this output off the blockchain.
Step 3: Once a broker is chosen, the user will request to use the resource.
Whether the user will be required to pay for this use or some other access
control scheme is used is dependent on the resource provider.
Step 4: Once the resource has been used an event will be generated on
the blockchain which will be the the proof of resource use. In Figure 7,
we show the content of a resource access event.





Figure 7: The content of a resource access event.
Step 5: The maintainers of the feedback state i.e., trust providers, will be
notified of the new resource access since the event is broadcasted on the
public chain.
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Step 6: The trust providers will then update the feedback smart contract
on the blockchain to update the feedback state. This transaction must
be completed by a registered trust provider and ensures that feedback
submitted is attached to a use of a resource.
Step 7: If the user is willing and/or incentivised they can then leave
feedback for that resource. This feedback is linked to the access event via
the unique id and the user’s ethereum account address.
Step 8: The feedback smart contract will validate the feedback using the
users address and submitted id. If valid the smart contract will emit a
feedback event with the users review. In Figure 8, we show the content of
a feedback event.







Figure 8: The content of a feedback event.
Step 9: Similar to step 5, the trust providers monitoring the events from
the blockchain will be notified that there is a new feedback event.
Step 10: Trust providers can then add this verified feedback into their
own trust calculations. Whether this is done in real time, batches or on
demand is dependent on the individual trust providers.
Step 11: Once the new trust score(s) are calculated the trust providers
can update the scores on the smart contract ready for the next user to
request them.
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It is clear that the system is self-sustaining on the blockchain which we
believe is another advantage in addition to the benefits we listed in Section 2.
6. System evaluation
This section outlines two key evaluations of our system. Firstly, a discussion
on how our system guarantees the two properties of our solution. Secondly,
we will discuss the results observed when the test implementation was eval-
uated. The experiments we have conducted, demonstrate the feasibility and
performance of our system.
6.1. Guarantee of the fundamental properties
Here we recall the two properties (discussed in Section 4) for convenience:
Property 1. Evidence are accessible to all parties interacting with the system.
This means that the sets X, I and Y are stored on a shared medium — the
blockchain.
Property 2. A feedback is always supported by an interaction.
Property 1 is guaranteed through the use of a blockchain. The key features
of using a blockchain are, immutability, transparency and decentralised control.
This implementation uses a private Ethereum blockchain, forcing the users of
the system to identify themselves for access to be allowed. Although there are
privacy concerns with the use of a private blockchain, this solution does provide
all users with direct access to the access requests, resource interactions and
feedback submissions. When any of these actions occur, an event is generated
and stored on the blockchain. This creates an immutable digital history of
actions performed in the system that any user can verify, fulfilling property 1.
Property 2 is also guaranteed but is not as trivial to prove. The implemen-
tation has a component labelled “feedback state” which is owned, maintained
and deployed by a trust provider or consortium of trust providers. This compo-
nent is responsible for monitoring the actions occurring on the blockchain and
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maintaining a world state that records what users have had a valid interaction
with a resource. This world state is what is used by the feedback smart contract
to validate any feedback submission. Each time a user submits a review, the
world state is checked to see if that user has had an interaction. If they have,
the review is transformed into feedback evidence and stored on the blockchain,
if not, the review is rejected and the transaction is reverted. Using smart con-
tracts and a registering/de-registering process, trust providers will ensure that
each feedback is linked to an interaction. For a user with m interactions, they
can leave n feedbacks, all of which are linked to a valid interaction. However,
using a deterministic evidence selection, only one feedback per interaction will
be used to calculate trust scores.
This way, the blockchain will only ever store reviews that has a supporting
interaction, hence, guaranteeing property 2.
6.2. Testing environment
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed architecture, we have imple-
mented the prototype using a private Ethereum blockchain. Our prototype is
built on a Dell Latitude 7490 Notebook with 8 GB of memory and an Intel Core
i5 processor. We used the go-ethereum implementation Geth, version 1.10.2, to
generate and interact with the blockchain networks. Python version 3.6, with
the Web3, version 5.18, library to generate and execute transactions. The smart
contracts are written using Solidity, version 0.9, which is a high-level language
for implementing blockchain smart contracts.
The testing environment mimicked the system architecture with less nodes
operating. The private test network consists of three nodes: a miner and two
peers. One peer acts as the resource owner and trust providers, while the
other acts as the user requesting trust scores, using the resource and submitting
feedback.
The trust providers are also responsible for maintainingy trust.py which is
a state maintenence program responsible for updating the feedback state once
resource use is detected. Only one trust.py program, is executed as there is
33
only one trust provider in the test network. Trust.py is vital for guaranteeing
property 2 for our system, however for testing purposes it is assumed that each
feedback is valid, as to get the maximum throughput as a result. With that
system set up the benchmark rounds were run as follows:
• Step 1: Test network is setup and the trust score, feedback and printer
resource contract are deployed.
• Step 2: A new user account is created for this round of testing.
• Step 3: That user account requests a trust score from the trust contract
about the resource. How long it takes to have this trust score returned is
recorded.
• Step 4: Simulate accessing the resource 11,110 times so that in the next
step each feedback is considered valid.
• Step 5: Generate the workload of transactions for this round. The tests
were ran with 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000 transactions in the workload to
calculate system performance under different workloads. The time taken
for all transactions in the workload to be computed by the feedback smart
contract and emit a feedback event is recorded. The cost (known as ether)
of each transaction is also recorded.
• Step 6: Repeat steps 2-5 as necessary.
Running the above testing 10 times, for a total of over 111,000 transactions
leads to the following results that is depicted in Figure 10. Next, we will discuss
these results in terms of performance and feasibility. To calculate average block
size and block time we ran a test using a workload of 100,000 transactions.
6.3. Performance
We note that from a performance perspective the major challenge is the
scalability of the user interaction time, i.e., how long does it take for a user to
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Figure 9: Transaction times for accessing a trust score and submitting feedback
been served (i.e., steps 1-2 and steps 7-8 of Figure 6). Below, we discuss the
transaction times and costs for, (1) a user requesting trust scores, and (2) a
user submitting feedback to the system as well as (3) our systems average block
generation time and number of transactions per block.
6.3.1. Transaction times for accessing trust scores and submitting feedback
Figure 9 shows the results from running throughput simulations on our sys-
tem where a user requesting a trust score from the trust provider and submitting
feedback to the system. It can be seen that as work load increases so does the
throughput of our system up to about 1000 transactions in the workload. This
implies that while the workload is under 100 transactions per second the re-
sponse time will be near instant. When the workload is small the throughput is
reliant on the block size and block mining time. It can be seen that the trans-
actions per second (tps) improves significantly once the workload increases and
saturates around 1500 transactions with 37 tps. Submitting feedback follows
the same pattern as accessing a trust score however we see a slightly higher
saturation point at just over 60 tps. We believe this is because the complexity
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Figure 10: Gas costs for accessing a trust score and submitting feedback
transaction simply needs to do one check and emit an event, while the access
trust score requires the transfer of a specific amount of ether.
6.3.2. Gas costs for accessing a trust score and submitting feedback
Figure 10 shows the gas cost in our system for accessing a trust score and
submitting feedback. The results indicate that the gas cost increases with work-
load but the increase is minimal and in a production network would not be
noticed by regular users. This allows the gas cost to remain functionally stable,
only increasing by a small margin and this is due to dynamic gas pricing by the
miner. In other words, as network traffic increases the miner will charge a larger
transaction fee resulting in a more expensive transaction for the user. For ease
of reading the gas cost for accessing has been multiplied by a scalar of 104.
The gas cost for submitting feedback also increases with workload and will
be noticed by users. This is because this transactions reads the state as well, to
validate the feedback but then must also emit an event, so as workload increases
miners will raise the transaction fee and gas cost which reflects to increase in
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Figure 11: Block generation time and average number of transactions per block
6.3.3. Average block time and number of transactions per block
Figure 11 shows the time to generate blocks and the average number of
transactions in a block under different workloads. In order to calculate average
block time we simulated the same workloads (10, 100, 1000, 10000) as our results
above and recorded how long it took each block to be generated and how many
transactions were in that block. Our system makes use of Ethereum’s ethash
consensus algorithm which will dynamically change the difficulty of the hash
puzzle based on current mining power. Ethereum tries to maintain an average
block time of 12 seconds and our results follow this pattern. Block size and in
turn number of transactions in a block is based on total gas limit which for our
tests was set to maximum, allowing up to 5000 transactions into a single block
when the workload demands are high. We notice that when the workload is
small the number of transactions in a block is equal to the workload i.e., when
the workload is 10 the number of transactions in a block is 10, same for 100 and
1000. This is because our feedback and access transactions are designed to be
simplistic, requiring less gas and ultimately allowing more transactions into a
single block thus increasing our system throughput.
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6.4. Feasibility and comparison
The achieved results indicate that our system is able to handle large amounts
of transactions in a reasonable amount of time. The critical transaction from an
end user’s perspective is how long it takes to retrieve trust scores and for this
purpose our system can be configured to perform this task within a few seconds.
The throughput also continues to improve as the workload gets larger indicating
that even when the system is performing under stress, accessing the trust scores
is still on a scale of seconds. The other key result is how long it takes for
feedback to be submitted and accepted. As this function produces an event it is
more expensive via gas cost, but this can be alleviated by incorporating a reward
system for honest users providing feedback. Lastly, we can compare a part of our
solution (i.e., how quickly a feedback/evidence can be verified) to an existing
trust based evaluation system [22], called social-chain. Note, proposal [22] is
based on a different consensus algorithm compared to ours. Proposal [22] claims
that they can handle 1 evidence per second whilst guaranteeing decentralisation,
our system currently simulating at around 70 feedback events second with higher
workloads. This is a significant improvement and since our system is using
Ethereum there is evidence that the system could be easily deployed on a public
blockchain e.g., the Ethereum main net.
For results that show similar trends but for delegated access control, we refer
to our previous work in [11].
7. Discussion on adversary model and attacks
In this paper, we assume that the communication occurs over secure chan-
nels. Therefore, protocol attacks, e.g., Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), are out of
the scope of this paper. There may be different kinds of attacks possible in
such a scenario [23]. Of more interest to us are attacks specific to trust systems.
Attacks on trust systems are generally carried out by hostile actors within the
trust system. These can fall into three categories, (i) trusted entities switching
to bad behaviour after a period of good behaviour, (ii) entities making false rec-
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ommendations, and (iii) a trust provider giving a false response to an enquiry
by a user [24]. Most previous work focuses solely on the first two and not the
latter, typically because such systems feature only a single trust provider and
trust in it becomes a basic assumption. Our system does provide some protec-
tion against a hostile trust provider, but before considering that issue we will
examine some of the more typical attacks [25] [26] [27] [28]. These include:
• Opportunistic service attacks: A malicious node provide good services to
increase the trust value held for it. Then it performs malicious activities.
• On-off attacks: This can also be seen as a random attack. In this attack, a
malicious node performs good and bad activities randomly to avoid being
labelled as a low trust node.
• Collusion attacks: Multiple hostile actors collude to give misleading feed-
back.
• Sybil attacks: A single hostile actor creates several accounts exploiting
multiple identities to provide misleading feedback.
Opportunistic service attacks and on-off attacks are examples of an entity
using an acquired trusted reputation to achieve a position from which to carry
out hostile activities. Collusion and sybil attacks both may make use of good-
mouthing (where the feedback given intentionally over-rates the value of an
interaction) or bad-mouthing (where the feedback given intentionally under-
rates the value of an interaction). Collusion attacks are where a number of
system entities launch good-mouthing or bad-mouthing attacks in concert. A
sybil attack is similar, but is where a single system entity creates multiple clones
of itself to launch good-mouthing or bad-mouthing attacks.
Some basic features of our proposal should be noted in considering how
our system inhibits various forms of attacks. The first of these is that trust
providers will only take feedback into account when that feedback is present in
the blockchain and linked to a record of an actual interaction. This is unlike
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many other systems, where a recommendation can be given even if no actual
interaction has taken place. Trust providers in our system can be certain that
an interaction has occurred. Second, in the applications that we envisage for our
system, payment is required. This means that hostile entities have to expend
financial resources to make false recommendations. The recommendation itself
is free, but can only be made after a non-zero cost interaction. In most systems,
there is no resource cost to making a recommendation. Finally, feedbacks are
time-stamped, allowing trust providers to determine when, and with what fre-
quency, feedbacks are given and whether there are any unusual patterns (e.g.,
spikes) in feedback provision.
These features make it more difficult for hostile entities in our systems to con-
duct good-mouthing and bad-mouthing attacks. In the case of bad-mouthing,
the hostile entity would have to interact with, and pay for a service from, the
entity it wished to bad-mouth. In many other trust systems, there is no way of
ensuring that an entity providing a low recommendation has actually interacted
with the service provider. This is not as effective a deterrent to good-mouthing,
as the recommender and service provider may likely be in collusion and can
arrange for a return of funds, but having to arrange for reimbursement adds
to the complexity of the attack. In the case of both good and bad-mouthing,
these attacks often occur in a short span of time, attempting to overwhelm
the genuine feedbacks. The time-stamping of recommendation reports on the
blockchain allows these unusual spikes to be detected and discounted. The num-
ber of feedback reports made by a particular recommender can also be seen. If
a recommender makes a series of low feedback reports about a service provider,
the trust provider could ignore such reports on the basis that a genuine user
would not continue to employ a poor service provider and such reports are likely
an instance of bad-mouthing.
Bad-mouthing and good-mouthing from a single entity are unlikely to have
much effect on the trust value returned by a trust provider for a service provider.
A successful instance of such attacks requires multiple recommenders if the ser-
vice provider’s reported trust value is to be affected. Hence, the employment
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of sybil and collusion attacks. In the case of a sybil attack, it is likely that the
hostile (cloned) respondents would only interact with the target entity. This
can be detected by the lack of presence on the blockchain of any other rec-
ommendations from these entities. Even if the cloned entities do make other
recommendations, these will likely be within a very short space of time, as the
maintenance of these identities, in an active state, by the initial hostile actor,
is unlikely. This especially true if all recommendations made by an entity in its
short active lifetime are negative. While collusion attacks may involve entities
with a longer active lifetime than sybil attacks, they again tend to occur in short
time periods. An unusually large burst of negative feedbacks is easily detectable
by the trust providers in our system.
An opportunistic service attack is very hard for any trust system to detect if
it is aimed at a single user. However, if all recent feedback for a particular ser-
vice, from all recommending entities, including those with extensive lifetimes of
active behaviour, are negative then the trust provider is able to conclude that
the service provider has turned hostile. Note that in many distributed trust
systems, a single poor interaction, even if it was the most recent one, would
have limited effect on a recommendation. In our system, due to the recom-
mendations being time-stamped, the pattern of behaviour of service providers
across multiple users is visible. By looking at the number of users reporting,
the trust provider can make a decision about whether this is a collusion attack
or an opportunistic service attack. On-off attacks are likewise hard to detect for
most trust systems and our system will also struggle to detect one. At best, the
time-stamping of feedback may allow the trust providers to detect a pattern of
switching between good and bad behaviour.
Much of the above discussion would apply to centralised trust systems (i.e.,
ones where individual interaction reports are made to a central trust manager,
which can be queried for recommendations) [29]. While centralised trust sys-
tems, in general, cannot rely on a genuine interaction having occurred, or at-
tackers needing to expend funds to access a service before making a recommen-
dation, centralised trust systems are aware of the time at which a report of an
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interaction was made. This is, as noted above, very useful in detecting certain
forms of attack. Our system delivers this without the drawbacks (single point
of failure, etc.) of a centralised system, while guaranteeing that an interaction
has occurred. More than this, our system allows for the existence of multiple
trust providers, which users can choose between. Users in our system can audit
trust provider performance, as the users also have access to the individual trust
reports, something not true in most centralised trust systems. In summary, our
system is both decentralised and provides transparent data to both the users
and the trust providers to enable them to come to decisions.
This extra availability of information helps protect the system against hos-
tile trust providers, something most previous work does not address. As the
users are able to access the trust reports directly from the blockchain they can
evaluate the trust provider responses if they wish. In most trust systems that
rely on a third-party trust manager, users have very little, if any, opportunity
to verify the veracity of recommendation values. Users in our system can also
avail themselves of multiple trust providers to determine the likely veracity of
responses. Therefore, our system, both by providing increased access to infor-
mation and the potential for multiple trust providers, gives some protection
against hostile trust providers, an issue not dealt with by other systems [30].
Note that our system allows not only the trust providers but the general
system users access to the recommendations. This potentially allows for new
and interesting interactions between the users and the trust providers, e.g., users
specifying which feedback trust providers are to use in calculating reported trust
values. This could be on the basis of the identity of the entities providing the
feedback, the time period in which the feedback was made, or the exact service
being provided. While most distributed trust systems also allow such choice,
they require the users to do the calculation. Here the calculations are carried
out by the dedicated trust providers.
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8. Related work
Trust is of interest to many areas, including physiology, sociology and com-
puter science, just to name a few. There is no universally accepted definition
for trust [31] and the interpretation can range from philosophical semantics to
technical implementation, and everything in between. For instance, trust can
be referred as to the honesty, truthfulness or even the reliability of a trustee.
It always varies depending on the context and the targeted use. Trust and rep-
utation in information and communication technologies are prime factors for
successful communication between two entities. The notion of computational
trust dates back to the early nineties. Since then, trust has been widely dis-
cussed, formalised and quantified [32] [33].
The notion of trust originates from social interactions. From the point of
view of the social sciences, it integrates the idea of social influence. This comes
from the characteristics and behaviour of an individual and can be measured as
the honesty, cooperativeness and their willingness to offer help within a social
group. There are wider definitions for describing trust in social sciences. In psy-
chology, trust represents a belief that says that a trusted person will do what
is expected [34]. This defines the aspect of trust from an internal phenomenon
(of a person) that helps to maintain a normal relationship between individuals.
Rousseau et al. [35] discuss trust as “a psychological state comprising the inten-
tion to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or
behaviour of another”. Other philosophical variants [36, 37, 38] of trust exist
in the social context but most of those definitions revolve around the notion
of belief, expectation and goal. In contrast, Lewis and Weigert [39] discuss the
notion of experience within a collective social group. In this setting, an obser-
vation becomes an evidence which leads to expectation. This is the fundamental
approach to trust that we follow in this paper.
In the area of computing and information technology, the notion of trust
is used in different areas including networking, security, artificial intelligence,
human computer interaction and e-commerce, just to name a few [1] [40]. There
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have been many works that discuss trust management models. It can be noted
that the trust score can be captured in various ways and based on the score
computation, different design choices can be made [41] [42]. The core concept
of trust in computing systems is derived from the social sciences. In general,
trust can be decomposed into various aspects e.g., device trust, entity trust and
data trust [43]. Cho et al. [44] define trust as a subjective belief about whether an
agent will exhibit behaviour reliably in a particular context with potential risks.
The belief is based on learning from past experience to maximize utility (or
minimize risk).
The notion of subjective belief has been well studied in other works as
well [45, 46]. The formal definition of trust in social sciences extends to com-
puter systems. For instance, Kimery et al. [47] discuss trust for online systems.
Trust is defined as “a consumer’s willingness to accept vulnerability in an online
transaction based on their positive expectations regarding an e-retailer’s future
behaviors”. This definition denotes the predicted behaviours of the users in an
online system. Similarly, Cynthia et al. [48] define trust as “an attitude of confi-
dent expectation in an online situation of risk that one’s vulnerabilities will not
be exploited”. In both cases, a user computes a belief to measure the reliability
of services to maximize utility or minimize risk. In this case, the user employs
computed belief (i.e., trust) to resolve choices between multiple services.
Artz and Gil [49] define trust based on reputation. Reputation is defined
as “an assessment based on the history of interactions or observations, either
directly with the evaluator (personal experience) or as reported by others (rec-
ommendations or third party verification)”. Since we assume evidence-based
trust, reputation building is closely related to our work, but we take a more
objective approach. That is, reputations are linked to proven interactions and
are objectively verifiable by all involved parties.
In [16], one of the earliest important works on trust in ICT, a trust-based
framework is defined based on subjective logic. This framework explicitly con-
siders uncertainty during trust evaluation. The arguments of subjective logic are
called opinions. An opinion is denoted as AωX , where A is the source of the said
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opinion and X represents the state of the variable in which the particular opin-
ion exists. Each opinion in subjective logic is equivalent to the binomial opinion
of the beta distribution function. These functions are employed to calculate the
success rate of an event based on the previous knowledge of interactions.
More recently, considerable attention has been devoted to the management
of trust frameworks. For example, Sharma et al. [50] present a generic frame-
work to manage trust considering qualitative and quantitative parameters. In
this framework, the trust management encompasses multiple phases that are
dedicated to different activities. No implementation is given to support the
framework. Moreover, no contextual information is taken into consideration for
trust computation. Aied et al. [51] propose a context-aware and multi-service
trust management system that uses past experiences of interactions when calcu-
lating the trust value. The proposed solution takes into consideration the various
resource capabilities of the interacting entities in a heterogeneous environment
in order to establish a community of trusted elements that respect the objec-
tives of the operation of a set of collaborative services. The trust management
system is controlled and governed by a trust manager. A simulation-based ex-
perimental study is conducted to show the performance of the proposed system
in managing trust and enforcing collaboration between the nodes. This approach
employs a centralised trust manager, with all the known disadvantages of that
approach. The proposal is also limited in scope, being specifically targeted at
co-operative services. Further, it is difficult to see how the approach could be
extended to more general services. Wang et al. [52] present a distributed trust
management mechanism for large-scale systems. The authors extract three basic
elements namely, service (i.e., defines the role of the trust management system),
decision-making (i.e., making a decision to deliver a service) and self-organising
(i.e., selecting a decision by the trust management system), of trust management
and then, based on a service model, a trust management framework is estab-
lished for the system. In this work, a fuzzy-based approach is employed for trust
value calculation. In [53], each device evaluates trust for a limited set of devices
that holds the same interest using both direct observations and indirect recom-
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mendations. In [18], the authors extend the work presented in [53] in particular
focused on Community of Interest (CoI) based social systems where nodes can
dynamically join and leave the system at any time. The major contributions
of this proposal are the dynamic adaptation and scalability management of the
trust management protocol in the context of highly large and scalable systems.
The dynamic adaptability property is demonstrated by showing that a new node
in the community can quickly build its trust relationship with other nodes with
desirable accuracy and convergence behaviour. To demonstrate the scalability,
an efficient storage management strategy is introduced keeping the view of lim-
ited storage space of resource-constrained nodes. In a storage space, each node
can keep the corresponding trust information towards a subset of nodes accord-
ing to their interest and storage space. A similar concept of trust management
system is presented by Chen et al. in [54]. However, our work differs from these
in that we provide evidence based trust with verifiable interactions and each
interaction is linked to a feedback.
The emergence of blockchain technology has been an important recent de-
velopment in Information Technology [55]. Blockchain was originally developed
as a distributed ledger whose absolute truth is voted through a consensus algo-
rithm. Thus, it removes the reliance on a trusted third-party. In a blockchain,
the ledger is held as a sequence of blocks recording transactions. The sequence
is linked through cryptographic hashes where the last block contains the hash of
its parent [56]. The consensus algorithm ensures that every node in the network
agrees with the state of the ledger and by extension all valid transactions stored
in the blocks. This information is reliable and transactions are traceable to the
underlying accounts. Being distributed, auditable, robust and scalable makes
the blockchain an important framework for other distributed applications [57].
There has been considerable recent interest in supporting trust through
the use of blockchain technology. For instance, Pietro et al. [58] present a
blockchain-based trust system for large-scale dynamic systems like the Internet
of Things (IoT). In this work, a distributed trust management model is intro-
duced that takes advantage of existing trust domains and helps bridge them
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to provide an end-to-end trust. Trust between the entities does not rely upon
a common root of trust. Blockchain technology is used to link the established
trust between interacting entities into longer trust chains. However, it does
not employ blockchain in the management of interaction evidence. Zhang and
Zhou [59] propose the use of blockchains to hold trust items of nodes, which in-
cludes reputation and trust values and trust-relevant data e.g., running, waiting
and processing time. However, this is part of their proposed future work, so no
implementation is given and no detail is provided about the manner in which
this would be achieved.
Other contributions have also proposed storing trust-related information in a
blockchain. This includes information about the interacting entities or the mes-
sages they exchange. For example, Huang et al. [60] store information about
the requestors and service providers for offloaded computations in a parked
vehicle assisted fog computing environment. The results of computations are
uploaded to the chain where miners check that the computations meet the task
requirements. This contribution also uses a financial-based approach in assign-
ing rewards for performing tasks. However, the evidence in the blockchain is
not directly used in the computation of trust values. Lu et al. [61] discuss
a blockchain-based anonymous reputation system that is used for trust man-
agement in VANETs (vehicular ad-hoc networks). However, in that proposal
blockchains are used to record the public key certificates of the validated enti-
ties and the revocation of these certificates. Trust related information is held
by a central entity (in this case, a law enforcement agency), not held on the
blockchain. Kang et al. [62] discuss the use of blockchain to support data shar-
ing in vehicular edge computing. Reputation is employed to decide with which
other vehicles it is safe to share data and subjective logic is used in the calcula-
tion of the reputation values. Smart contracts manage the storage and data and
meta-data on the blockchains. Each vehicle calculates trust values separately
based on their own interactions and the blockchains, and the information stored
in them, play no role in this calculation. Similarly, in Wu and Ansari [63], the
blockchain is not used directly for trust management. Instead, the blockchain
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is used to secure the access control. Each device stores and maintains its own
trust-related information.
Some contributions have made use of blockchains for the storage and man-
agement of trust-related information. For example, the final, calculated, trust
values can be stored on the blockchain. For example, Shala et al. [64] for ma-
chine to machine application services. Test agent evaluate the trust level (1-5)
of services and, after computing the trust level, store this information on a
public blockchain network. The aim of Kim et al. [65] is to enhance trust be-
tween nodes in wireless sensor networks and eliminate malicious nodes from the
network. Trust in this proposal is based on a number of factors, e.g., close-
ness, honesty, intimacy and frequency of interaction and is computed by each
node for each other node. Once trust values are computed they are placed in a
blockchain by a Base Station. Again, no other trust information in placed on
the blockchain. Another similar approach, from a trust point of view, is Yang
et al. [66] where, again, final calculated trust values are stored in the blockchain,
in this case trust values are calculated by road-side units on vehicles in vehicu-
lar networks. In none of these examples is other trust-related information, e.g.,
actual evidence, stored on the blockchain
There are other contributions which have made more extensive use of the
possibilities offered by blockchain technology to support trust management. One
of the earliest examples of this is Dennis and Owen [67]. Their contribution
addressed peer-to-peer networks, where for a each transaction a record whether
the transaction was positive or negative was added to the blockchain. There
was, however, unlike our system, no guarantee that such an addition represented
an actual transaction. Also, trust values themselves were not added to the
blockchain. Another example is Zhao et al. [68], which places both trust values
and data related to node behaviour in the blockchain. The data related to
node behaviour is quite detailed. While this may be suitable for the application
are of that contribution (Software Defined Networks), the presence of detailed
information about node performance in a public blockchain is not advisable
for general situations, as it risks security and privacy breaches. In contrast,
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our proposal places evidence of the interaction occurring on the blockchain,
not sensitive data about the content of those interactions. A similar example
is Boussard et al. [69], which also addresses SDN networks. Again, sensitive
data is stored on the blockchain, by observers of the behaviour of nodes. This
is not directly relevant to systems which involve actual interaction and relies
on implicit trust in the observers. They do, however, have the concept of an
analyzer, which uses the data on the blockchain to derive trust values and is
related to our concept of trust providers.
Dedeoglu et al. [70] propose a trust system for sensor nodes involving
blockchain. The actual data from observations is not stored on the blockchain,
instead transactions recording the collection of data and the reputation of nodes
is stored on the blockchain. However, as with the previous contribution, this re-
lies on implicit in the data trust modules. A further example is Adnan et al. [71],
where trust is used to evaluate messages sent between members of a VANET.
Both the messages and the calculated trust values are placed on blockchains.
However, the messages in this system concern events observed by the nodes
and the trust calculation is based on the number of other nodes observing the
same event. It is unclear how the approach could be generalised to systems
where events are not shared in this manner. There is also no checks made that
a node has actually observed an event. It could simply be repeating a report
from another node to improve its trustworthiness. The system also requires
four separate blockchains in its implementation, which is a significant overhead.
A similar approach is taken by Zhao et al. [68] which addresses trust in nodes
in a SDN. While both evidence and trust values are stored in the blockchain,
the evidence relies on readily observable behaviour of the nodes, such as switch
throughput. This approach is not readily adaptable to situations involving evi-
dence that derives from private interactions between two parties in the network.
Similarly for Yan et al. [22], where the nodes are trusted to generate the evidence
and there is no check that an interaction actually occurs.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, there has been considerable
interest in employing blockchain techniques to enhance trust management. How-
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ever, our proposal is unique in both giving an assurance that an interaction has
actually occurred, without relying on either readily observable behaviour and/or
a privileged central component, and in allowing multiple trust providers to ac-
cess the evidence and provide separately calculated trust values. This leverages
the well-known financial applications of blockchain technology and allows the
implementation of trust-as-a-service.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a formal framework for trust systems where
evidences are backed up by provable interaction records. The approach is simple
yet powerful enough to capture various instances of scoring ranging from simple
averaging to more complicated functions that account for the type of services
and temporal signatures on the interactions and feedbacks.
We designed a blockchain platform that implements our framework (using
Ethereum blockchain). In particular, we have shown that the properties pro-
vided by blockchains are crucial to guarantee the two fundamental properties
required for the framework to be sound. The performance analysis of the proto-
type implementation supports the feasibility of our approach. We also provided
a detailed discussion on the general benefits that our approach contributes to
improving the resilience of trust systems to attacks, in particular to hostile trust
providers. While our system inherits the same mitigation capabilities as cen-
tralised trust systems, it provides further protections which come from verifiable
interaction and the inherent financial cost for all blockchain transactions.
The present state of our work has some limitations. For instance, we take
the universal set of evidence as the ground truth in the sense that it is void
of uncertainty. However, the atomic review ratings themselves will have some
inherent uncertainty as it is next to impossible that all users are very sure of the
ratings they give for the interactions they had. We also did not investigate the
notion of trust update which is crucial for implementing trust systems efficiently.
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